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1.1 Background and Motivation
The Internet has caused a revolution in trading. About a decade ago people had to sell the
items they did not need anymore by means of a yard sale or an advertisement in the local
newspaper, but nowadays they can offer their item on an auction site and potentially
reach millions of interested people. Relatively cheap items that were not worthwhile
advertising for in the past are now easy to sell on the Internet. As a consequence, sellers
nowadays offer a wide range of products on the web, creating an abundance of choice
for consumers. Before the Internet era it was virtually impossible to find very specific
items such as particular chairs, books out of press, or carpets, just to name a few, but
nowadays consumers have the opportunity to browse on different auction sites for the
item they really want. Hence, both the ease with which consumers can offer an item to a
wide audience, as well as the fact that consumers are more likely to find items that match
their preferences, has caused trade in the Internet to grow exponentially [AS03]. Along
with this success story however came the stories of people being victimized by fraudulent
online sellers. These frauds cover a range from not delivering what has been promised,
i.e. the overrating of a product’s condition, to deliberate acts of theft and are a result of
so-called asymmetric information.
Economist George Akerlof in his 1970 article [Ake70] explained the dangers emerging in
markets where strong asymmetry of information and strong competition may deteriorate
the quality of the goods exchanged, and eventually let the market disappear. The example
of used cars retail is typical. People buy used cars that are advertised to be “in perfect
conditions” at low prices. However most cars have hidden mechanical problems that
become visible soon after the deal. Such cars are called “lemons” in the retailers’ jargon.
This can as well happen with artificial societies, where information asymmetry is intrinsic.
Traditional protection authorities are often unable to trace back perpetrators and punish
them. Very rarely contracts offer inspection of the merchandise before the payment. On
the contrary, speed of dealing is one plus of the medium. Actually, countermeasures are
being considered: resorting to brand name is one, but it is not effective when laymen are
dealing with each other, as they may have no brand name or not a strong one. Important
online auctions recommend using secure third party payment methods, such as Paypal.
But again, this may become costly, and is no definitive solution as it relies simply on
5another type of central authority enforcement. One solution to be further investigated
is building trust by means of user-oriented rating mechanisms. That’s why this paper
analyses and compares existing trust and reputation mechanisms that were proposed to
address this problem.
When looking at current literature, it has to be note that the concept of trust (and trust
generation) is almost always mentioned in connection with the concept of reputation.
The expansion of the topic on trust is rooted in the importance of trust for reputation
concepts. Thus the fundamentals of reputation mechanisms are often derived from trust
algorithms, and several papers presenting reputation approaches such as Zacharia’s and
Moukas’ papers on Sporas and Histos [MZM99, Zac99, ZMM99], start by explaining im-
ages and trust-generating concepts and only as a second step analyse the distribution of
evaluation information. Consequently, and furthermore for the reason of completeness,
in this paper both trust and reputation concepts will be reviewed. Thereby the level of
detail of the mechanisms varies from simple rough drafts to mathematical formalizations,
which however leave some key questions concerning the implementation unanswered and
finally to the description of algorithms with mathematical equations. However, in the
context of this paper, it won’t be possible to review all approaches in detail, as on the
one hand, in the limited space of this paper no comprehensive all-embracing analysis is
possible, and on the other hand, it would be necessary to first elaborate to what extent
the implicated algorithms of some draft paper might be realizable. Nevertheless in order
to get down to an executable but at the same reasonable description, the proposals shall
be examined within the scope of several bigger categories.
So far several authors as for example [eRe06, JIB07, Kuh99, RJ96, SS05, YS00, ZMM99]
have brought forward concepts for such categories, whereas the best known ones are the
classification by Winter [Win99] which is based on the proposals of Rasmusson and Janson
[Ras96] and Zacharia [ZMM99], the classification by Marti and Garcia-Molina [MGM06]
who propose a taxonomy of trust and reputation systems in the P2P context and the
classification by Sonnek and Weissman [SW05] who compare reputation systems in the
Grid.
Looking at Winter’s classification first (figure 1), it has to be realized that Winter distin-
guishes “soft”- and “hard control”, where the first one refers to trust-based social mech-
anisms. Under “hard social control” Winter understands an agent-system-based social
control that is not based on trust, but on the institutionalization of norms, such as resti-
6Figure 1: Classification of Reputation Mechanisms by Winter [Win99]
tution or expulsion options [Win99, p. 142 et. seq]. Putting it in other words, “hard
social control” can be seen as the reputation of the system and its reputation mechanism.
Hence, if agents trust that a reputation mechanism can filter out and penalize defecting
agents, they are more likely to trade in that system. Although this classification approach
is rampant, it has some disadvantages that make it unusable for this paper. Thus it is
problematic to integrate cognitive concepts as well as the impact of 3rd-party-information
in Winter’s classification, however as it will be explained in chapter 1.2 these are integral
parts of reputation mechanisms.
In contrast to Winter, Sonnek and Weissman include third party information in their
model which is based on the works of Jøsang et al. [JIB07] and analyse the effectiveness
reputation mechanisms in a service-oriented Grid context where clients request services
from competing service providers [SW05]. They explicitly assume the possibility of inten-
tionally given false reputation information, and by comparing several feedback algorithms
regarding the inclusion of lying agents as well as mechanisms for identifying them, they
derive an own feedback algorithm and prove its functionality by implementing and testing
it for a specific scenario. However, looking at the overall classification approach, it has
to realized that although Sonnek and Weissmann go into detail when analysing feedback
mechanisms from several mechanisms, other classification aspects such as the storage of
the data or the scoring and ranking of information is missing.
The latter aspect was taken up by Marti and Garcia-Molina. They identify three basic
components of reputation systems that can be seen in figure 2, namely “information
gathering”, “scoring and ranking” and “response”. Afterwards they break them down into
separate mechanisms, categorize properties the mechanisms need to provide in order for
7the reputation systems to fulfil its functions and discuss the implementation limitations
and trade-offs that may prevent some of the properties from being met [MGM06].
Figure 2: Classification of P2P Reputation Mechanisms by Marti and Garcia-Molina
[MGM06]
The properties Marti and Garcia-Molina discuss are very detailed, however, due to their
focus on P2P reputation systems, their discussion misses aspects about the logical storage
of reputation information, which is decentralized in P2P systems, but can be centralize
in artificial societies in general. Furthermore, although reasoning about their taxonomy
in detail, Marti and Garcia-Molina do note analyse any existing reputation mechanism
within their classification.
In this paper we try to overcome these drawbacks and develop a comprehensive trust and
reputation mechanisms classification for artificial societies that will afterwards be used to
analyse several existing mechanisms in chapter 3.
1.2 Image and Reputation
After this short introduction to the problem of reducing uncertainty and increasing trust
in the artificial societies, in this section the terms trust and reputation shall be briefly
explained. The definition used builds on social science and cognitive literature as within
this area of research reputation and its effects have been discussed at length.
To start, we will define the term reputation as we understand it and relate it to the term
image that will be of importance in the further course of the paper:
Image is a global or averaged evaluation of a given target on the part of an individual. It
consists of a set of evaluative beliefs [MC00] about the characteristics of a target. These
8evaluative beliefs concern the ability or possibility for the target to fulfil one or more of
the evaluator’s goals, e.g. to behave responsibly in an economic transaction. An image,
basically, tells whether the target is “good” or “bad”, or “not so bad” etc. with respect to
a norm, a standard, a skill etc.
In contrast reputation is the process and the effect of transmission of a target image. The
evaluation circulating as social reputation may concern a subset of the target’s charac-
teristics, e.g. its willingness to comply with socially accepted norms and customs. More
precisely, we define reputation to consist of three distinct but interrelated objects: (1) a
cognitive representation, or more precisely a believed evaluation (any number of agent in
the group may have this belief as their own); (2) a population-level dynamic, i.e., a propa-
gating believed evaluation; and (3) an objective emergent property at the agent level, i.e.,
what the agent is believed to be as a result of the circulation of the evaluation [CP02].
Putting it simple, an image is the picture an individual has gained about someone else
(the target) based on his own previous interaction with that target. If using reputation,
the individual expands the information source about the target beyond its own scope and
includes the information of others about the target as well.
2 A 5-Stage-Process-Model for Reputation
In order to analyse and compare existing trust and reputation systems for artificial soci-
eties we propose a classification scheme which shall be briefly explained in this chapter.
This classification scheme is firstly based on Sabater and Sierra [SS05], secondly on the
ideas from the EU funded Project eRep [PEJ+09]1 and on the reputation process model
by Padovan et al. [PSEP02] which was used for the highest layer roots.
In contrast to the classifications introduced in chapter 1.1, we do not see the reputation
generation and usage dissectionable, but rather as a holistic process that stretches from the
recording of transaction behaviour after one transaction to the usage of the reputational
information for the next transaction. Therefore, our classification scheme is based on a five
stages process, which takes place between two transactions of an agent, as demonstrated
in figure 3.
1The ideas for classifying trust and reputation mechanisms were formulated formulated in Deliverable
1.1 [eRe06] of the eRep project. For more information see http://megatron.iiia.csic.es/eRep/
?q=node/93.
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The stages start after the settlement of a transaction i and are called recording, rating
and storage of cooperation behaviour, the recall of the former agent behaviour and last
but not least the modification/adaption of agent’s strategy. Along these stages, the trust
and reputation models will be classified in this paper. Therefore, first of all the different
stages will be explained in more detail.
2.1 Recording of cooperation behaviour
As a first step in the transaction phase model, after a settlement of a transaction, the
cooperative behaviour of each transaction partner has to be recorded. Thus, all trust- and
reputation models have to record the cooperative behaviour. These models are classified
whether they are able to manage different contexts of cooperation or not.
“If we trust a doctor when he is recommending a medicine it does not mean
we have to trust her when she is suggesting a bottle of wine.” [SS05]
This example makes clear, that trust and reputation are context dependent and as a
consequence models need to be classified whether they are single- or multi-context models.
A single-context trust and reputation model
“[...] is designed to associate a single trust/reputation value per partner
without taking into account the context. A multi-context model has the
mechanisms to deal with several contexts at a time maintaining different
trust/reputation values associated to these contexts for a single partner.”
[SS05]
Real multi-context models have to be differentiated from models, which seem to be able
to handle multi contexts through instantiating more single-context models (each one for
a special context).
“So what really gives to a model the category of being a multi-context model is
the capability of making a smart use of each piece of information to calculate
different trust or reputation values associated to different activities. Identify-
ing the right context for a piece of information or using the same information
in several contexts when it is possible are two examples of the capabilities that
define a real multi-context model.” [SS05]
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Finally, it should be mentioned, that not in every application scenario a multi-context
model is necessary. Adding the capability to deal with several contexts has to be paid
with increasing complexity “and adds some side effects that are not always necessary or
desirable” [SS05]. Furthermore, in special contexts, like eCommerce, it might be possible
to put all trust and reputation information into one context without loosing too much of
it.
2.2 Rating of cooperation behaviour
After the recording of the transaction partner’s behaviour, the recorded behaviour (and
ultimately the transaction partner) has to be rated [PSEP02]. The rating of cooperative
behaviour phase looks at the recording and considers the algorithm used in the model
to aggregate the rating values. Thereby, very broadly, three different approaches can be
distinguished: Is there a cognitive approach, whose beliefs can not be aggregated mathe-
matically, or is the model a mathematical one or even a composition of both approaches?
In a cognitive approach mental states lead to trust other agents and perhaps lead to the
decision to interact with these target agents afterwards. Game-theoretical/mathematical
approaches consider trust and reputation as “subjective probabilities by which an indi-
vidual A expects, that another individual B performs a given action on which its welfare
depends” [Gam90]. Thus, trust and reputation are not, like in the former case, a result of
a mental state, but a result of a pragmatic game with utility functions and a numerical
aggregation of results in the past. [SS05] The result has to be mapped to a certain metric,
which has to be unique within the system.
2.3 Storage of cooperation behaviour
After the rating of the transaction partner, the corresponding information has to be stored.
Depending on the actual implementation, it can be stored by the transaction partners
themselves or by a third party. Thereby, this categorization entry focuses on the logical
data management and not on the physical data storage. The logical data management
can be centralized or decentralized. To show by an example, that the logical view on the
data is not necessary dependent from the physical data storage, one can think of a P2P
network, which provides a logically centralized view of all data on the participating nodes.
But the physical data storage is per se organized decentralized in such networks. In the
12
context of this work only the logical data management matters, because with a logical
centralized view of all reputation data, the reputation model is able to use all data. With
a decentralized view on reputation data, the agent and thus the reputation model is not
able to see all these ratings. Instead, the individual agents have to make requests for other
agent’s former experiences with a certain target agent.
2.4 Recall of cooperation behaviour
Before entering the negotiation or agreeing upon a new transaction i + 1, the software
agents recall available ratings about the prospective transaction partner (either based on
their own experience or based on their own incomplete information in combination with
the not necessarily trustworthy information provided by a third party) [PSEP02]. This
dimension regards the information sources that the models take account of calculating
trust and reputation values. The dimension is structured hierarchical. On the first layer
it is differentiated whether there is an information exchange in the system. If there is
no interaction in the system and only direct experiences or prejudices - that are more
reliable however not available for all agents - are being used to assess the trustworthiness
of a possible transaction partner, the systems are (usually) called Trust systems, as by
definition reputation systems require an exchange of information in the system. In case
information is exchange, further distinctions can be made:
Information exchange
If the trust- and reputation system provides information exchange between agents, there
are two new dimensions to categorize the models. The first one is about the reliability
of reputation values, the second one about the provision of semantic information. Wit-
ness and sociological information [SS05] are both two possible instances for exchanged
information types.
• Meta-belief:
Does the trust- and reputation model provide a measure of how reliable a specified
trust or reputation value is? “Sometimes, as important as the trust/reputation value
itself is to know how reliable is that value and the relevance it deserves in the final
decision making process” [SS05].
• Value’s semantic meaning:
Third agents’ evaluations depend on subjective cognition. To interpret this evalu-
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ation, it is necessary to know the former evaluations of this evaluator in order to
interpret the value correctly. For example a rating of 0.7 (in a continuous measure
between 0 and 1) from an evaluator A for a target has to be interpreted different
from the same evaluation value from evaluator B, if evaluator B is known for its
low ratings.
• Type of exchanged information:
The current model can be established in two big groups: those models which assume
boolean information and those models which assume continuous measures. Although
this seem to be a very simple difference, choosing one approach or the other, has a
great influence in the design of the model. [eRe07] Models based on an aggregation
mechanism usually have to use continuous measures.
Furthermore, the software agents can make use of the recalled information and rate them.
Rating information influences the actual decisions of software agents in the selection of
potential transaction partners. The most important impact criterion is the fact, whether
the model allows cheaters or other malicious agents in the system and the agents to
consider cheating and false information in their decision about cooperative behaviour.
In analogy to Sabater and Sierra we use three levels to show the degrees of agent’ cheating:
• Level 0:
The model does not consider cheating behaviour. There are many honest agents in
the system, that the ratings provided by malicious agents are not preponderated.
• Level 1:
The models classified here must be able to handle agents which hide information,
but never lie.
• Level 2:
The models classified into the highest level must even be able to handle lying agents
and provide mechanisms to identify them.
2.5 Learning / Adaption of Strategy
Last but not least, the agents have to adapt their own future strategy to the experiences
made before. The agent for example can utilize individual reputation thresholds to choose
suitable interaction opponents. After a interaction has failed it might adapt this threshold
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and increase it to choose more reliable partner in the future. On the other hand, if an
interaction worked out well, the agent might be willing to decrease this threshold in order
to select a transaction partner with a higher matching probability when for examples
markets are used match supply and demand.
Nevertheless, this issue is very important in the field of trust and reputation model almost
all trust and reputation models we will consider in section 3 exclude proposals on this
topic due to the high context-dependency of the strategy.
The following section will consider different reputation mechanisms following the special
view defined in this section.
15
3 Reputation Mechanisms for Artificial Societies
3.1 Marsh
The first concept that shall be analysed with the help of the 5-stage-process-model is the
Trust-concept by Stephen Marsh. [Mar94] Looking at the recording of the cooperation
behaviour, it has to be noted that Trust is a multi-context model (i.e. it can to handle
different contexts of cooperation) as Marsh distinguishes between three types of trust in
his thesis: basic trust, general trust and situational trust. [Mar94, p. 55]
Basic trust is the trust the agent has independently from the current transaction-offering
agent. It is calculated from all the experiences accumulated by the agent. General trust
is the trust an agent has in another agent without taking any specific situation or context
into account. This is done in the situational trust calculation, in which Marsh uses the
formula
Tx(y, α) = Ux(α)× Ix(α)× T̂x(y) (1)
to determine the situational trust Tx(y, α) of agent x (the truster) in agent y (the trustee)
in the specific situation α2, resulting of the subjective utility U(α) and the subjective
importance I(α) of the situation. [Mar94, p. 62] Thereby the utility Uα can take values
of the interval [−1, 1), whereas the importance of the situation comes from [0, 1]. The last
term of the equation T̂x(y) refers to a possible weighted mean value over the evaluations
of the general trust for agent y by agent x in the past ( ̂Tx(y)t−n; ...; ̂Tx(y)t−1). As
the trust function itself, it can take values from the interval [0, 1) 3. Along the lines
of situational trust, Marsh furthermore makes intensive calculations depending on the
standard of knowledge an agent x perceives an agent y to have for a situation α and
specifies equations for three states of competence he distinguishes. These three states are
[Mar94, p. 73 et seq.]:
1. The state in which agent is not known in the specific or a similar situation (e.g. if
the agent has never trade with the other agent before).
2. The state in which an agent is known but not in the specific or in a similar situation
(e.g. in case the agent has traded with the other agent before, but in a totally
2When talking about situations Marsh refers to the comparability of actions. According to Marsh
trustworthiness always refers to experiences in comparable situations.
3Marsh excluded the value 1, as it would represent blind trust, and consequently would not be expedient
[Mar94, p. 57].
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different context).
3. The state in which the agent is known and trusted in the specific or a similar
situation (e.g. in case the agent has traded with the other agent before, in the same
context).4
The perceived-competence-variables, Marsh calculated for the three cases, are then used
in the rating process when evaluating the cooperation behaviour. In this process, Marsh
discusses several ”dispositions”, namely optimistic, pessimistic and realistic agents, and
calculates their trust evaluations from the past up to a certain point that is either de-
termined by the agents’ memory size or the number of previous encounters. Hence, for
the estimation of its partner’s trustworthiness, an optimistic agent takes into account the
maximum value of all previous comparable transactions, whereas a pessimistic one will
consider the minimal value.5 Although Marsh included these cognitive ”dispositions” his
concept analyses trust purely mathematically, as not mental states lead to the decision to
trust another agent, but subjective probabilities.
Once, Marsh has calculated the values for the situational trust, they are stored locally by
each agent to be then used in case an agent is offered a transaction with the evaluated
agent once more. Hence, the system Marsh envisaged decentralized in terms of the data
management [Mar94, p. 5]. If an agent is approached with a transaction offer, Marsh
calculates a cooperation threshold to determine whether the agent should interact with
the potential transaction partner, or not:
Cooperate Thresholdx(α) =
Perceived Riskx(α)
Perceived Competencex(y, α) + T̂x(y)
× Ix(α) (2)
Thus in case, the Cooperation Threshold is reached or passed, a transaction can take
place. In case several agents at the same time offer a transaction and more than one
extravagates the threshold, Marsh discusses different procedures. Thus he points out
that the agent has the option either to choose the generally most trustworthy offering
agent, or the one most trustworthy with regard to the situation, etc. It even might make
its decision depending on all procedures and choose the agent which does best in most
4Thereby, the equations Marsh specifies for case number (2) and (3) are expansions of the standard
formula for the perceived competence Perceived Competencex = TxIx(α), that is used in the first
case. Concerning the equations themselves, it has to be noted, that although specifying equations,
Marsh himself tends to use estimations instead of exact calculations.
5For the realistic or pragmatic agents, Marsh consults the mean value of all previous encounters that
from the situation’s point of view are comparable to the new one.
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of them. As these calculations show, Marsh’s Trust-concept does not take into account
any third-party-information and as such does not calculate any reputation-values. Hence,
when looking at the recall phase, Trust, as its name already indicates, has to be identified
as a trust system.
If, finally, the agents decided to trade with one another, after each transaction the general
trustworthiness in terms of the Cooperation Threshold is adjusted by each agent using
multiplication. [Mar94, p. 79 et seq.]:
Marsh showed this mechanism using an iterated prisoner dilemma which is exemplarily
shown from agent x’s perspective in the following table:
Y cooperates Y deceives
X cooperates T t+1x = T
t
x × 1, 01 T t+1x = T tx × 0, 99
Tx(Y )
t+1 = Tx(Y )
t × 1, 10 Tx(Y )t+1 = Tx(Y )t × 0, 90
X deceives T t+1x = T
t
x × 1, 05 T t+1x = T tx × 0, 95
T t+1x = T
t
x × 1, 01 T t+1x = T tx × 0, 90
Table 1: Adjustment of agent X’s Cooperation Threshold for Y
In the table it is important to note that the number values can be chosen freely by each
agent, although Marsh strongly suggested to penalize deceitful behaviour more strongly
than to award the cooperative one, as in the real world it is easier to lose, than to gain
trust.
When trying to evaluate Marsh’s approach, all in all it does not seem very complex but
easy to implement. However, it harbours several problems. Thus, when commenting on
Marsh’s approach Schillo [SFR00, p. 36 et seqq.] for example, points out effects that are
owned to math. Marsh, at least partially, sees these problematic cases as well; however he
sticks to the conviction that his formalization models trust successfully. [Mar94, p. 143]
The problems addressed by Schillo can be exemplified when looking at the equation for
the situation trust (see equation 1).
In this equation Marsh uses a product whose factors can be negative. This leads to the
unusual side effect that the situational trust is positive in case the agent does not have
any trust in his potential trading partner and hence attributes a negative trust value to
18
him and at the same time judges the utility of the situation negative as well.6 Marsh
describes this effect as ”machiavellian” and reckons that to a certain extent it can be
useful to leave transactions that do not seem useful or important to these agents who are
less trustworthy. Further equivocal effects that result from the use of multiplication and
the interval [-1,1]lead to the problem that in the case of trust- or utility-indifference (i.e.
T̂x(y) = 0 or Ux(α) = 0) by the agent the situational trust is assigned 0, which is a value
that is difficult to interpret.7 When these mainly mathematical problems are put aside,
several further questions remain for the discussion of Marsh’s concept. Thus one must
analyse whether the proposed formalizations would result in a reliable complete system if
they were implemented in artificial societies, for instance. For answering this question it
seems reasonable to examine Marsh’s approach for its functionality. Thereby especially
the aspect of social control (i.e. to what extent deceiving agents can be filtered out and
excluded from the market-place) is of special interest. [Mar94, p. 138]
Generally, the discussed formalization seems to be suitable for reducing fraud. Thus, if
agent y cheated agent x, there is a high probability that in the future agent x will not
trade with y again. However, the values for modification of the general trust have to
be adjusted drastically to reduce the general trust in case of fraud. With these adjust-
ments at least pessimistic and realistic agents can reasonably protect themselves against
deception. Nevertheless, as no communication between the agents exists, a streetwise
agent can systematically betray all other agents once without the system stopping it. In
this respect, the request for a secure total system cannot be fulfilled by Marsh’s mecha-
nism.8 Besides the question of functionality, it has furthermore to be asked whether the
underlying sociological assumptions endure the limitations of a technical system. For his
definition of trust, Marsh chose the work of Morton Deutsch, Niklas Luhmann, Bernard
Barber and Diego Gambetta as a starting point, whereas the latter had the biggest impact
on him. [Mar94, p. 25 et seqq.] This influence can, for example, be seen in the adoption
of situation- and agent-specific cooperation thresholds as well as in the conception of situ-
ational trust as a product of utility and importance on the one hand and trustworthiness
on the other. Thus it can positively be noted that through the inclusion of the situation
6Similar arguments can be found against the Cooperate Threshold formula, if for example the Perceived
Competencex(y, α) + T̂x(y) = 0.
7In his comments on ”No Trust and Distrust” Marsh himself distinguishes among four possible interpre-
tations (relating to general trust) of the value 0.
8As a matter of fairness, it has to be said that the establishment of a totally secure system was not the
departure point for Marsh’s considerations. He concentrated on the establishment of trust relations
and their implications for co-operation, instead of the security of the system and even proposed himself
to establish a communication between agents as possible solution. [Mar94, p. 116]
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and its significance, Gambetta’s idea of social arrangements influencing the necessity of
trust [Gam90, p. 220] was taken into consideration. Furthermore Marsh considered the
unequal speed in the growth and decline of trust respectively. Putting it in a nutshell,
“Trust” represents an approach that is fairly easy to implement. It is based on the idea
that agents calculate trust-estimations independently from other agents based on their
own experiences. The practicability of the mechanism is, as a result, dependent on the
adjustment of several parameters (e.g. the decline of trust in case of fraud or the memory
margin). As explained before, the usage of the interval [-1,1], the quantitative imple-
mentation and the negligence of third-party information seem questionable and present
challenges.
To sum up the findings about Marsh’s Trust-concept, it has to be said that it has been
formative for many further developments and algorithms in the artificial intelligence trust
and reputation research. However, besides the question of whether his estimation of the
cooperation threshold and the trustworthiness are sustainable, one of the main points
of criticism in Marsh’s model is that in the rating phase his agents only rely on their
own observations and do not include any third-party information in the calculation of the
trustworthiness.
Some of the authors who tried to propose models tackling this problem were Alfarez
Abdul-Rahman and Stephen Hailes [ARH97a, ARH97b], Lars Rasmusson and Sverker
Jansson [Ras96, RJ96], Michael Schillo et al. [Sch99, SFR00] as well as Bin Yu and
Munindar P. Singh [YS00]. Although these approaches do have the same basic idea in
common - namely, that the experiences of other agents in the network can be included
when calculating trust and reputation values and when searching for the right transaction
partners - they vary when it comes to the questions of how to weight the third-party
information and how to deal with the friends of friends as well as information from agents
who seem to be not very trustworthy. One of the best known approaches in this category
is the TrustNet-concept of Michael Schillo [SFR00] which shall now be reviewed in more
detail.
3.2 Schillo
The single-context TrustNet approach by Schillo et al. was published in 1999 as an
expansion of a ”Trust-concept” by Castelfranchi et al. [CdRF97]. Originally intended
for implementing trust in MAS, compared to Marsh the concept goes one step further in
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the recall phase and furthermore allows for agents to exchange witness information with
one another and to use this information for their cooperation decisions. Thereby Schillo
considers not only the pure gossip, but includes the lack of validity of the benevolence
assumption in open systems by including assumptions about the honesty and the degree
of altruism of other agents in his thoughts (level 2 in the modification phase). However,
in total, only a single trust value is attributed to each agent, hence in the recording phase
no context-dependent differentiation of the trust values takes place.
The basic idea and first central element of Schillo’s concept is based on a repeated 5-step-
Prisoners Dilemma that works as follows:
(1) in the first part of a round the agents have to pay a participation fee. (2) The second
step is negotiations in which the agents can make (false) announcements about their
intentions. (3) A PD-round is played and both agents publish their moves simultaneously.
(4) The results of the round are announced. They can be seen by the two agents involved
and by the agents in their neighbourhood. (5) The fees are paid out.
Schillo’s idea now is that in the phase (2) the agents have the opportunity to interview
agents they know about the unknown trading partner. Furthermore the results from
phase (4) can be used to update the TrustNet. As a result, agents who did not keep their
promises from phase (2) can be spotted relatively fast not only by their trading partners,
but by the neighbourhood as well. Hence Schillo concludes that untrustworthy agents
won’t be able to find partners after some rounds and thus cannot earn any more points
[SFR00, 829 et seqq]. How this mechanism for estimating the trustworthiness works in
detail shall now be explained.
Schillo’s model is based on the probability theory and therefore has to be classified as
mathematical model in the second (i.e. the rating) stage of the process model, although
he considers cognitive concepts such as altruism9, etc. in the model. In order to be able
to assess another agent’s trustworthiness, an agent generates models about the agent’s
honesty and altruism. Thereby an agent Q’s “honesty” E(Q)10, which is supposed to
express the probability that an interaction is processed according to the announcements, is
represented by the coefficient of the number of transactions that was processed according
to the announcements against the total number of transactions. Along this lines, for
9The agent acts altruistically if it cooperates irrespective of his opponent.
10The letter E is derived from the German “Ehrlichkeit” that can be translated with honesty, fidelity or
forthrightness in English.
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simplicity reasons, Schillo models agent X perception of the honesty Ex(Q) of agent Q,
and about Q’s altruism affinity Ax(Q)
11 respectively. [Sch99, 49 et seqq.]
When it comes to the third stage in the process model - the storage of cooperation
behaviour stage - the second central element of Schillo’s approach comes into play: the
TrustNet, which has stored all information centrally from the logical data management
point of view and therefore serves as memory for other agents’ trust estimations. The
TrustNet itself is a data structure and has the form of connected vectors as shown in
figure 4:
Figure 4: Schillo’s Trust Net
[Sch99, p. 73]
In the model the nodes represent the agents and the edges the observations. Observations
by the agents are sets of triples of the form (PD−round, alt, ehrl), whereas alt (altruism)
and ehrl (honesty) can either take the boolean values yes or no, or can be kept secret
[Sch99, p. 52]. Each agent has got his own data structure in which it is represented by the
root-node X (no incoming - and only outgoing edges), while the other nodes represent the
neighbour-agents which can give direct (direct connection of root node and agent-node)
or indirect (witness) information about the trustworthiness of a potential trading partner.
The information is stored with the edges and the derived assessments are filed as a model
of honesty and a model of altruism by the respective nodes [Sch99, 72 et seqq.]. In general
this graph may have cycles (in figure 4 this is the case when looking at A −→ D −→ C),
however with the help of an adequate algorithm, Schillo tries to eliminate them as far as
possible in order to have only the edge with the highest information content remaining
[Sch99, p. 79]. Besides this difficulty, the integration of multiple witness information
about an agent poses a further problem in Schillo’s concept. That is why he introduced
an additional recursive algorithm which, by dint of probabilistic considerations about the
motivation of the agent12, delivers an integrated estimation of the honesty and altruism
11As Schillo uses probability value, the values all lie in the interval [0, 1].
12In this scenario Schillo assumes that agents want to cast a damming light on other agents and thus he
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of another agent.
But how does an agent calculate the trustworthiness of his potential trading partner in the
recall stage of the transaction process? Starting from the generated honesty and altruism
models the trustworthiness V 13 of an agent Q which offered a transaction to agent X can
finally be calculated, where the V -value represents the probability that the cooperation
will be successful [Sch99, p. 78]:
Vx(Q) =
Ax(Q)
Ax(Q) + (1− Ax(Q))(1− Ex(Q)) (3)
When comparing Schillo’s model to Marsh’s, it is unmistakable that Schillo attaches more
importance to the derivation and justification of the formulas and equations used by him.
Furthermore, in contrast to Marsh’s concept, no problems concerning the multiplication of
negative values appear, as Schillo uses probability values for describing certain behaviours.
In addition he predicates social norms as the equivalent to trustworthiness and thus uses
honesty and altruism as well as the possibility of the deliberate concealment of information
in his model. Comparing Schillo to Marsh, Schillo’s definition of trustworthiness Vx(Q)
has almost the same meaning as the situational trust Tx(Q,α) in Marsh’s model and
is used to select trustworthy cooperation partners by consulting and evaluating witness
information. Instead of a “simple” memory for situational trust values, Schillo proposes
a data-structure, the TrustNet, in which trust information for the agents in the net and
the gossip as well as the altruism and honesty values are stored. As mentioned before
(when referring to the recording of cooperative behaviour-stage) Schillo does not, however,
include any situational observations as they would make the concept far more complex.
Thus no equivalent to Marsh’s situationally dependent basic trust of an agent is present
in the TrustNet.
However Schillo’s attempt poses problems as well. For example, he does not go into
detail about the problematic situation of new agents who are completely unknown to the
TrustNet. He only mentions that in phase (2) of his model all agents are informed about
the self-description of the new agent and can cooperate with it or not. The new agent can
then choose the most trustworthy one from the ones who are willing to transact with him
and a deal is agreed on. Concerning the functionality of the whole system (to increase the
concludes that they will be more willing to give evidence about cheating than about honest behaviour.
Based on these assumptions a stochastic-method-based heuristic can be derived that helps to determine
the number of positive behaviour observations an agent kept secret.
13The letter V is derived from the German “Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit”.
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preparedness for cooperation and to reduce defective behaviour), Schillo noted that in the
long run, if enough models for the agents have been developed, altruistic agents perform
better than their less friendly counterparts. Hence, Schillo’s approach at first glance
seems to create incentives to be honest and cooperative. However it is unclear whether
these qualities can be found in artificial societies as well, as they can do have an open
structure and agents can leave and enter the market as they wish. Furthermore, in the
case of cooperative behaviour, “cooperative cliques” may form that impede new agents
from breaking into the market and just leave them with the possibility of bargaining
with egoistic agents who are not members of the ’cooperative cliques’. As a result the
question can be posed whether personal and public knowledge of the agents is sufficient,
or whether additional variables such as the information bundles from Sztompka [Szt99]
should be included in the calculation of trustworthiness.
Summing up the information about the TrustNet model, it has to be acknowledged that
both its theoretical foundation as well as its implementation are based on Schillo’s ideas
of an openly played PD with a partner selection. Hence, the question comes up as to
what extent the demand to apply the model to other areas can be fulfilled. Schillo sees
a direct connection between the PD and the situation in artificial societies and talks of
a direct interrelation of both. Nevertheless he makes little comment about the actual
implementation in artificial societies. Thus he does not refer to the possible situation
of a complete information asymmetry (some agents trade on the market for a long time
and some completely new agents enter the market) and he does not account for the
scalability of his model and whether it will work on large markets with potentially 1000
up to 100,000 agents. This last problem, the lack of scalability, becomes less important
when considering that in large markets possibly only small cliques of agents who know
one another emerge. However this results in the question, as to how the dilemma of
neighbourhood and publicity shall be solved in open markets. Furthermore the question
of the data storage has to be solved. Thus Schillo specifies the storage complexity of each
agent with O(n2r) whereas n indicates the number of familiar other agents to an agent and
r accounts for the number of played (and stored) PD-rounds. Hence the storage complexity
is higher than in Mash’s concept (O(nr)), as in the TrustNet model the information from
the edges has to be stored additionally. Concerning the time complexity, TrustNet uses
the principle of lazy evaluations; viz recalculations of the evaluations are executed in case
a new palpable offer is at hand. Thereby inclusion of edges takes place in the cubic time
(O(n3)) and consequently is relatively costly.
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To recap, TrustNet is an interesting approach for calculating trust and reputation. It is
more complex than the model of Marsh; however, both the nature of the trustworthiness
assessment as well as the inclusion of inter-agent communication make the concept more
substantiated. Nevertheless it remains questionable whether the desired functionality
(to increase the preparedness for cooperation and to reduce defective behavior) can be
achieved outside the controlled and synchronized test scenario.
3.3 Rasmusson and Janson
Another scientist who studied reputation mechanisms for artificial societies and thereby
focused on the inclusion of third party information in the recall-stage was Lars Rasmusson
[Ras96] who worked together with Sverker Janson [RJ96, RRJ97] on general concepts to
ensure security in open agent-based networks and tried to prove them with the help of
simple simulation systems. As a result of their work, Rasmusson and Janson, mainly for
scalability and monopoly avoidance reasons, plead for a decentralised organized reactive
security approach. Hence, according to their ideas, security shall primarily originate from
agent behaviour and shall not (or only additionally) be imparted by central institutions.
For the realization of their approach, Rasmusson and Janson sketched several ideas that all
used a centralized approach in the storage phase. These ideas included the implementation
of Trusted Third Parties (TTP) for financial transactions or the introduction of special
reviewer agents for example, but, most importantly, they made proposals for a social
approach: thus, agents should be in the position to actively obtain information about
other agents and to pass on heard gossip. However, a problem occurs in this regard,
which was already discussed by Schillo: at least in highly competitive environments,
agents have a certain incentive to lie, as negative information about an agent can result in
competitive advantages for its competitors [RJ96, p. 14]. Therefore possible amplification
of gossiping can lead to agents advertising themselves. A possible solution to the problem
of the deliberate transmission of false information that was proposed by Rasmusson is the
use of money, so that agent A which wants to praise itself or another agent (B), has to
pay agent C to remember him or B [Ras96, p. 25]. Therefore, Rasmusson’s and Janson’s
mechanism can be said to be a kind of recommendation mechanism, where the recording
of the behaviour (in stage one of the 5-stage-process model) is not context dependent and
only takes place if the recommended agent (which can be the recommender itself) pays
for it. The rating the the recorded behaviour was than aggregated mathematically.
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Besides these social proposals, as Ackerlof [Ake70] did, Rasmusson wanted to demon-
strate the importance if reputation mechanisms for market stability and market success
and in this context achieved simulation results that are of further interest, although he
only included favourite choice approaches in his studies [Ras96, p. 29 et seqq]. His
results indicated that a complete orientation to price (without looking at any trust or
reputation values) reduced the total quality of the market and stable conditions were
only achieved after several buying-agents had declared bankruptcy. In the case where the
price-orientation was combined with the restriction of a single market place a monopoly
developed. However, as soon as he included favourite choice approaches in his experiments
and consequently allowed for the agents to remember the behaviour of their trading part-
ners, the proportion of defecting agents decreased and (in combination with a multi-market
concept) a stable and qualitatively high-value situation was achieved. Ramusson assumed
that these positive effects might even be strengthened through the implementation of
gossip; however, he did not prove this idea in his experiments.
3.4 Abdul-Rahman and Hailes
A further reputation concept that shall be discussed is one of Alfarez Abduhl-Rahmen
and Stephan Hales [ARH97a, ARH97b, ARH00]. Their model that pursues a perspective
different from Schillo, is directly related to internet-based MAS and is supposed to help to
implement trust as the basis of informal-, short-term-, or commercial ad-hoc transactions.
Therefore they propose that every agent carries along a network of trust relationships in a
database, hence hence information are stored decentralized. Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes
define a ’trust-relationship’ as a vectored connection between exactly two entities, which
in some circumstances can be transitive. In this way they distinguish between direct
trust relationships (“Alice trusts Bob.”) and recommender trust relationships (“Alice-
trust-Bob recommendations about the trustworthiness of other agents”). Consequently,
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes make a context-dependent distinction in the recording phase.
Thus, an interesting contrast to the other formalizations lies in the fact that due to the
qualitative nature of trust, Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes do not work with probability
values or the [−1, 1] interval, but use a multi-context recording model, i.e. discrete values
that are not universally valid, but are related to certain trust categories (“Alice trusts
Bob, concerning “table”-transactions. However, she does not trust him when it comes to
“chair”-transactions.”). The discrete values used can be seen in table 2.
26
Value Significance for direct Significance for recommender
trust relationship trust relationship
−1 Distrust - completely untrustworthy Distrust - completely untrustworthy
0 Ignorance - cannot make Ignorance - cannot make
trust-related judgement about entity trust-related judgement about entity
1 Minimal - lowest possible trust
2 Average - mean trustworthiness
(most entities have this trust level)
3 Good - more trustworthy
than most entities
4 Complete - completely trust
this entity
Table 2: Discrete trust value after [ARH97b, p. 53]
As a result, Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes define reputation as a ’troika’ (agent − ID,
Trust − Category, Trust − V alue). Each agent stores such reputation information in
his own data-base and uses it to articulate recommendations. However, in their concept
Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes make no comments on how agents derive these evaluations.
Nevertheless, the core of Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes’ papers allegorize their thoughts
about a recommendation protocol that can be used to communicate recommendation re-
quests and statements as well as updating inquiries within the MAS. In the protocol, a
recommendation request, for example, is passed on until one or more agents are found
which can give information for the requested category and which is trusted by the penul-
timate agent in the chain. Based on this idea Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes propose a
mathematical algorithm for the rating phase in which the requesting agent can use the
following equation to calculate the trustworthiness of a recommendation. For tv(Rx) as
the recommender trust value of the different recommendations of the involved agents and
rtv(T ) as the trust value articulated by the last agent14 the trustworthiness result from
the following equation:
tvr(T ) =
tv(R1)
4
∗ tv(R2)
4
∗ ... ∗ tv(Rn)
4
∗ rtv(T ) (4)
14In case an agent receives more than one recommendation about another agent, the values are averaged.
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In summary, both the missing justification for the special way of calculating reputation
(that was admitted by the authors) and the absence of any information on how agents
derive their direct trust values, the lack of inclusion of any cheating possibility (in the
modification phase) as well as the necessity for a global standardized category-ontology
indicate serious conceptual problems for the model. Nevertheless, due to its qualitative
and at the same time algorithmic approach, the outline seems worth mentioning, whereas
especially the idea of conceiving trust and distrust (referring to a certain category) not as
a continuum but as a condition has to be highlighted.
3.5 Regan and Cohen
Regan and Cohen [RC05] proposed a system for computation of “indirect” and “direct”
reputation in a computer-mediated market. Recognizing that centralized public values of
reciprocal ratings between agents may bring about collusion, blackmailing and retaliation,
the authors propose that only evaluations about sellers should be taken into consideration.
Their assumption is that reputation is to be used to find quality sellers rather than buyers,
as the former have more control over exchanges, especially in an A2A (all to all) online
market. Evaluation from buyers on sellers should then be transmitted opaquely with
respect to the latter. Their objective is simply to propose a mechanism which reduces
the “undesirable practices” possible in actual reputational online applications, especially
on the part of sellers, and thus to prevent the market from degenerating into a “lemons
market” [Ake70] where only low-quality goods are listed for sale. For calculating “direct
reputation” the authors refer to a mathematical rating model proposed by Cohen and
Tran [TC01]. This proposal postulates the partition of the seller pool into three sets:
(1) the ones with a good image, (2) the ones with a bad image, (3) the ones with an
uncertain image in the eyes of the prospective buyer. Reputation is then an integer from
[+1,−1.0] respectively where the zero value is assigned to unknown sellers, +1 to the
“good” ones and −1 to the bad ones. To calculated the reputation value, the seller’s
contract performance is confronted with the buyer’s satisfaction threshold. This may
be set as to make it difficult to gain a good reputation, and relatively easy to lose it.
Furthermore the transaction’s value is taken into consideration what makes Regan and
Cohen’s model a multi-contextual one in terms of money as Regan and Cohen distinguish
between expensive and inexpensive transactions and do not treat all transactions equally.
This model has integrated introducing agents into the role of “advisors”, that is, agents
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owning direct information about the target. Advisors own a reputation as informers. To
model this request process, the authors propose two examples: (1) peer-to-peer networks
like Gnutella [Rip01], where a network’s information list is available to every node through
a software-connecting all peers, which is used to send requests and receive information; and
(2) some centralized server maintaining every evaluation from agents to which requests
are to be sent. Some corrections should be applied to account for possible adviser’s
bias. First, only highly reputed agents are being asked. Secondly, advisers with similar
preference patterns as one’s own are to be preferred. Information provided is not being
weighed on their reputation (as it happens in Sporas, see chapter 3.6). Information with
high deviation from the mean is ruled out. Following the actual transaction, the seller’s
as well as advisers’ reputations are updated. The authors admit that their model alone
has a problem with agents abandoning pseudonyms with a bad reputation, because it
assigns a lower value to an agent with a bad reputation than to an unknown entrant or
“newcomer”. Among the possible solutions mentioned there is: a third-party authority
assigning not renewable unique identifiers to agents; monetary incentives for keeping the
same pseudonym over time, with some form of market entrance cost; the possibility of
selling a good reputation when deciding to leave the market; some cautionary sum to
be deposited on entrance that would be given back when leaving with a neutral-to-good
reputation.
This model presents many drawbacks: its modelling of reputation transmission is un-
satisfactory, as it does not consider the possibility of spontaneously giving reputation
information to some selected recipient. Here, like elsewhere, only asking and answering is
contemplated. However, despite its evident simplicity, this model tries to tackle the prob-
lem of collusion between rating agents, positioning the rating activity in a way that only
sellers are evaluated in an opaque way with respect to them. This is obviously only part
of the solution, because it would be good to have some indicator of the buyer’s reputation
as well for the sake of buyer’s time.
3.6 Sporas and Histos
Zacharia, Moukas and Maes [ZMM99] proposed Sporas as a reputational system imple-
mented in an artificial electronic auction environment named Kasbah [GMCD97]. Kas-
bash is designed to provide a semi-automatic means of conducting business, with human
users controlling a set of input variables for their agents. Sporas was inspired by the
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foundations of the chess players’ evaluation system called ELOS, which is a method to
evaluate a player’s relative strength in one-to-one games such as chess. Consequently it is
not surprising that Sporas is an eBay-like-mechanism that, based on mutual evaluations
after the transactions, provides global reputation values as a part of the identity of the
agents and tries to ensure that the agents themselves cannot change these values. Histos
in contrast uses the idea of social networking in order to calculate personalized reputation
information and thereby makes use of the web of trust described earlier [Kuh99, p. 368 et
seqq.]. Both ideas come about not as agent-specific (decentralized), but centralized from
the logical storage point of view. Hence if an agent asks the systems for the reputation of
another user, the system calculates this value (depending on the degree by which the user
is involved in the social network) and reports it back to the inquiring agent. But how do
Sporas and Histos work in detail?
Sporas is designed to make available reputation values to users of agent-based, loosely
connected online communities [ZMM99, p. 3]. Thus the basic principle is a mathematical
rating mechanism, with reputation being a natural number between 0 and 3000, whereas
new agents start with a reputation value of 0, under which no agent can ever drop (as
otherwise an incentive to simply change identities of the value falls under 0 would be
given). Furthermore, if agents release reciprocal evaluation; then for each pair of agents
only the very last rating is counted. The reputation of a single agent is then aggregated
by the central system and published for all to see. As an agent’s reputation gets higher,
it is adjusted in a way that decreases the rate of accretion so that the rapidity of possible
change (in both directions) decreases as reputation increases. The function used in order
to calculate the new global reputation values for the agent after each transaction is as
follows [ZMM99]:
Rt+1 =
1
θ
t∑
1
Φ(Ri)R
other
i+1 (Wi+1 −
Rt
D
) (5)
with
Φ(R) = 1− 1
1 + e
−(R−D)
σ
(6)
Thus, the new reputation value (Rt+1) is consistent with the sum of all previous reputa-
tion values, (recorded on a single context basis) weighted with the memory factor θ (the
bigger θ , the bigger the memory of the system), modified by the attenuation function Φ
(σ controls the slope of the function) set against the reputation of the evaluating agent
(Rotheri+1 ) and the actual evaluation of the transaction (Wi+1) which comes from the inter-
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val [0.1, 1]. The value D thereby represents the maximum value of reputation (3000). In
case Wi+1 is smaller than the hitherto existing reputation value divided by the maximum
reputation D (this value should represent the expected value), the agent’s reputation de-
creases; otherwise it increases. The goal of this formalism is that with a large number of
evaluations, the reputation value Rt+1 converges with the real reputation of the agent.
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[MZM99, p. 316]
When trying to evaluate the mechanism, it should be said that some advantages are al-
ready present in this very standard system: (1) as agents’ earlier evaluations are discarded
when a new one is added; the illegal reciprocal reputation inflation between collusive
agents can be antagonized. (2) Reputation can not descend below the entry level. This
is a disincentive to get a new identity each time agents get to have a low reputation and
hence could resolve the problem of “cheap pseudonyms”. Furthermore it also acts as a
discrimination imposed on new entrants. However, on the other hand, it discriminates
against new-entrants as they are mostly going to have a lower level of reputation than
defrauding agents, whose reputation value cannot decrease below the starting value of
new-entrants (0). Another advantage of the Sporas system can be seen in the fact, that
the reputation value can not exceed 3000. This is useful in avoiding accumulating perma-
nent indestructible positive reputations. (3) The rater’s reputation influences the degree
to which its ratings are weighted. While the first two properties appear as viable solutions
to some online reputation mechanism problems, the third makes good reputation more
difficult to change than the initial low reputation. This is a preference for high reputation
which is not encountered in every day, offline life, and which seems therefore unrealistic.
In addition, reciprocal evaluation should not be considered the only way to implement a
reputational mechanism, as this feature has a relevant impact on the type and quality of
information thus produced.
Histos is Sporas’ evolution and consequently has similar characteristics concerning the
5-stage-process model. It is a mathematical single-context model with a decentralized
logical data storage and uses third party information in the recall phase as Sporas does.
However, looking at the degrees of cheating accounted for, it has to be noted that - besides
15As the Sporas algorithm is supposed to be combined with Histos, it can be assumed that as in Histos,
the evaluation of the underlying data structure is a graph in which agents are represented by nodes
and the most current evaluations (including timestamps) are diagrammed by vectors (comparable to
Schillo’s TrustNet concept). Hence, in order to calculate the reputation value all vectors pointing to
an agent have to be included chronologically. Thus, if a system consists of n agents, which in the
worst case have all been evaluated by one another, the storage complexity of this structure is O(n2)
and consequently very high.
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the data storage - further differences between the two can be found.
Histos is used in an environment where the latter (or any other) system was already used to
produce a bulk of evaluations. In this case it does not use the Sporas algorithm any more
but uses the agents’ social network analysis to weight the social evaluations received about
possible partners. The reason for this expansion of the Sporas concept is that in Histos
it is assumed that agents tend to trust evaluations of “friends” (agents they have already
communicated with) more than the ones of complete strangers. [ZMM99, p. 166] That
is why it is based on a collaborative filtering algorithm which counts previous exchanges’
outcomes to create connection networks among “friends” and “friends of friends”, up to
any attainable level of connection. Thereby, as in Sporas, the net of paired evaluations
is assumed to be a net of vectored graphs, consisting of nodes representing agents and
vectors representing the most current evaluations by agent. In order to calculate the
personalized reputation of an agent L, Histos examines the graph as to whether a direct
path exists between A and AL [ZMM99, p. 167]. In case a graph of length 1 can be found,
AL was evaluated by A. Otherwise a “breadth first” (i.e. a universal search parameter)
search is conducted to find all paths between A and AL, whereas the paths are maximally
allowed to have the length N . For the calculation itself only the θ newest paths concerning
the evaluation of AL are being used. In order to finally calculate the reputation of AL the
reputation values of the agent one node part of have to be known. Therefore the reputation
of these agents is calculated recursively (maximum length of the paths is consequently
N − 1) up to the agent one step apart from A, for which the evaluation by A can be used
as a basis for the calculation. As a result the degree of complexity of the recursion is
O(θN). The actual calculation of the reputation value finally can be carried out with the
following slightly modified formula16 [ZMM99, p. 167]:
Rt+1 =
1
θt
t∑
t−θr
Φ(Ri+1)(R
other
i+1 Wi+1)/
t∑
t−θr
Ri+1 (7)
with
θt = min(θ;m) (8)
and
m = deg(AL) (9)
16Regarding the application of the formula it has to be pointed out that it is only used if a direct path
between two agents can be found. In case no or only paths longer than N between the two agents
exist, the Sporas algorithm must be resorted to.
32
whereas m is the number of paths between A and AL as discussed above. This alteration
of the formula brings advantages in terms of the network load if agents had contacts with
several other agents; however, the use of reciprocal evaluation which gave the input evalu-
ations may have biases concerning the quality of social information expressed. Moreover,
every evaluation is public and thus visible by the target; this may inhibit transmission of
evaluations, as perceived responsibility increases. In any event, the weighing of evalua-
tions for personal assessment of a target’s reputation is important progress on the way of
implementing an artefact’s realism in online reputation mechanisms. Therefore, putting
it in a nutshell, it can be concluded that Sporas / Histos can contribute to steady artificial
communities by providing reputation mechanisms. However, a limitation of the mecha-
nisms can be derived from the assertions that not the agents themselves, but their users,
conduct the evaluations (what leads to subjectivity) and that the system only remembers
the last mutual evaluations. This might lead to a collapse in the following situation: As-
suming an agent B has a transaction with every other agent in the system and does not
defraud, all other agents give him a positive evaluation. In a second round B again tries
to barter with all other agents; however, this time it cheats every time and is consequently
given negative evaluations. Now assuming that θ < 2N the following problem arises. As
from every agent a path to B < N is given, the question about B’s reputation is answered
with the help of the Histos algorithm. In this algorithm, however, the knowledge of B’s
negative evaluations does not help the single agent, as in the second round only the per-
sonal positive experience of each agent (from the first round) is considered. Consequently,
in this very special case, the algorithm fails as due to their positive experience in the first
round, every agent is going to trade with B in the second round, although in this round
B is defrauding every time. The problem might be solved if not only the last ’personal’
paired experiences of the agents were taken into consideration; however, this attempt re-
veals other problems of the centrally organized reputation mechanism as the calculation
complexity as well as the storage complexity would increase significantly in case the last
θ evaluations of and for every agent were stored. Hence it seems sensible to combine the
Sporas / Histos approach with a “memory” of the agents as well as gossip-mechanisms
and to leave the evaluation to the agent instead of their owners.
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3.7 Yu and Singh
In the year 2000 Yu and Singh proposed a single-context agent-oriented model for so-
cial reputation/trust management which focused especially on electronic societies and
MAS and uses the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence17 as the underlying computational
framework [YS00]. In their papers Yu and Singh, on the one hand, introduced a gossip-
mechanism (“If agent A encounters a bad partner B during some exchange, A will penalize
B by decreasing its rating of B by β and informing its neighbours.”) [YS00, p. 6] in which
the gossip shall be transferred incrementally through the network of agents. On the other
hand, it arranges for a mechanism that should help to include other agents’ testimonies
(witness information) in their own reputation calculations. Thus, in the trust part of the
mechanism, Yu and Singh rely on the personal direct experience of agents concerning other
agents. Thus, their agents store information about the outcome of every transaction they
had with another agent and recall this information in case they are planning to bargain
with an agent a second time. In case the agent meets another agent it has not traded with
before and consequently does not have any direct information about this agent, the second
part of Yu and Singh’s model comes into play: the reputation mechanisms (based on third
party information)18. In this mechanisms so-called referral chains are generated that can
make witness information available across several intermediate stations. An agent is thus
able to gain reputation information with the help of other agents in the network. How-
ever, this reputation information is not global as for example in eBay (where every user
can see all profiles of all other members and every evaluation a user is given accounts for
his reputation value), but depends on the referral chain the requesting agent is using. As
this chain represent only a small extract of the whole network, the information delivered
by the chains can be partial and thus may not be representative (decentralized logical
information storage).
Yu’s and Singh’s algorithm itself finally works in two steps. The first one concentrates on
updating the information an agent has about another agent after it has traded with it.
It therefore classifies each transaction as a positive - (cooperation) or negative experience
(defection) and respectively expresses a positive or negative evaluation for the other agent.
17The Dempster-Shafer theory is a mathematical theory of evidence based on belief functions and plau-
sible reasoning which is used to combine separate pieces of information (evidence) to calculate the
probability of an event. The theory was developed by Arthur P. Dempster and Glenn Shafer. More
information including an in-depth explication of the theory can be found in [Sha90]
18It is important that the second part of the algorithm (the witness information based on the referral
chains) is only used in the case that the agent does not have any direct information about his potential
trading partner. Otherwise, it will only act based on its previous experiences.
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In the case of a negative experience the evaluation is indicated in form of a value β < 0; in
the case of a positive one in the form of a value α > 0, whereas the scaling of the positive
and the negative evaluations can vary and thereby directly influences the operation mode
of the algorithm. In their paper Yu and Singh propose to choose (for example α = 0.07
and β = −0.5) in order to factor negative experiences more strongly than positive ones. In
order to finally update the reputation information after positive or negative interactions,
Yu and Singh use the following mathematical formulas19:
Calculation of trustworthiness:
Ti(j)
t > 0; j has cooperated→ Ti(j)t+1 = Ti(j)t + α ∗ (1− Ti(j)t) (10)
Ti(j)
t < 0; j has cooperated→ Ti(j)t+1 = Ti(j)t + α ∗ (1−min(|Ti(j)t|, |α|) (11)
Ti(j)
t = 0; j has cooperated→ Ti(j)t+1 = Ti(j)t + α (12)
Ti(j)
t > 0; j has defected→ Ti(j)t+1 = (Ti(j)t − β)/(1−min(|Ti(j)t|, |β|)) (13)
Ti(j)
t < 0; j has defected→ Ti(j)t+1 = Ti(j)t + β ∗ (1− Ti(j)t) (14)
Ti(j)
t = 0; j has defected→ Ti(j)t+1 = Ti(j)t + β (15)
In case no direct experience of the agent is available, it has to rely on the information
given by the referral chain. This inclusion of witness information about an unknown agent
n uses the following 3 variables:
L = number of different witness testimonies w in E={E1w, ..., ELw}20
19Ti(j)
t is the trust of i in j at the time t.
20 The calculation of the witness testimony is done with the help of the referral chains. In case of
branching in the chain, the agent chooses the branch he assumes to be more trustworthy and then
specifies the reputation values Ti (j) (the trust of the witness in the target, the trust of the next-to-last
in the witness, etc.) with the help of the operator ⊗ that is defined as follows:
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, V = the subset of E that only includes the witness testimony of trustworthy witnesses
and in case of equally trustworthy witnesses only includes the better testimonies, Ê =
mean value of all witness testimonies in V .
The calculation based on these variables works as follows:
Ti(n)
t > 0 ∧ ∧E > 0→ Ti(n)t+1 = Ti(n)t +
∧
E ∗(1− Ti(n)t) (16)
Ti(n)
t < 0 XOR
∧
E < 0→ Ti(n)t+1 = Ti(n)t +
∧
E /(1−min(|Ti(n)t|, |
∧
E |) (17)
Ti(n)
t < 0 and
∧
E < 0→ Ti(n)t+1 = Ti(n)t +
∧
E ∗(1 + Ti(n)t) (18)
Inclusion of gossip (Tk(n)) about n that an agent i is told by k:
Ti(n)
t > 0 and Ti(k)
t > 0 (19)
Ti(n)
t+1 = Ti(n)
t + Ti(k)
t ∗ Tk(n) ∗ (1− Ti(n)t) (20)
Ti(n)
t < 0 and Ti(k)
t < 0→ Ti(n)t+1 = Ti(n)t + Ti(k)t ∗ Tk(n) ∗ (1 + Ti(n)t) (21)
different algebraic signs→
Ti(n)
t+1 = (Ti(n)
t + Ti(k)
t ∗ Tk(n))/(1−min(|Ti(n)t|, |Ti(k)t ∗ Tk(n)|)
(22)
In the context of several extensive experiments, Yu and Singh used these equations and
showed that the implementation of their mechanism results in a stable system in which
the reputation of defrauding agents decreases rapidly while the new, cooperating agents
experienced a slow, but almost linear increase in reputation, if suitable values for α and β
where chosen (i.e. |α| < |β|). Although the experiments indicate the functionality of the
algorithm, two problems have to be taken into consideration. The first one was already
x⊗ y :
{
xy for x ≥ 0 ∧ y ≥ 0
−xy else.
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mentioned above: the model does not combine the sources of information it takes into
account (direct information and witness information [including gossip]) so that if an agent
has already traded with another one it cannot use the network information any more and
thus might need an unnecessarily long time to react to an agent defecting suddenly who
cooperated before. Furthermore Singh and Yu do not give any explanations of how their
agent-centered storage of information of the social (i.e. public) knowledge (for example of
the referral chains) is supposed to be organized. Consequently no analysis of the network-
load and the storage-intensity can be made.
3.8 Padovan et al. (AVANLANCHE)
The Avalanche reputation mechanism [Eym00] that was implemented in Java is a single
context model that uses a mathematical rating mechanism. It includes domain-specific
“rating agents” (or -agencies) which can each provide specific reputation information
[PSEP02]. In Avalanche the single agents pursue the goal of trading goods in several
interlinked market-places. As a part of their negotiation strategy they therefore use an
agent-specific reputation coefficient between 0 (bad reputation) and 1 (good reputation)
which they assign to every other agent they know. This coefficient is then used by the
agents to compare possible transaction partners not only based on prices, but on the
possible loss as well. Therefore the reputation value the agent attributes to his possible
trading partner is accounted for as the probability of the non-advocacy of a loss, so that
in case of a 100 per cent assumption of a loss, twice the price is used as a bargaining basis
[Pad00, p. 9 et seqq.]. After each transaction the participating agents then change their
mutual evaluations. Thus, a successful transaction is rated with r = 1 whereas a failed
one is rated with the value r = 0. For the final calculation of the reputation coefficient
of agent Y (from agent X’s point of view) Avalanche uses the following formula which
furthermore includes the weighting factor α:
RXYt+1 = R
X
Yt(1− α) + rtα (23)
One important feature of this equation is that cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour
are both represented by α (or -α), although cognitive conceptualizations of reputation and
trust suggest to punish defection heavier (cp. Yu and Singh for example). Concerning the
reputation calculation of unknown agents, Padovan et al. propose to take the average value
of all known reputation evaluations of all agents, or, in case these data are not available,
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to use a default value. The introduction of one or more rating-agencies is discussed as
an expansion of the model as it stands so far. These agencies are a kind of “subjective”
external elements to which single agents have to (or can) forward their evaluations. For
every agent Y the agency then saves a reputation value RY that is changed analogue
to the changes of the reputation coefficients by the agent. However, when it comes to
collecting the decentralised stored reputation information, the agency does not save the
originator of the single evaluations, but only stores the actual reputation value and its
variance. Hence, an agent can constantly deliver evaluations for another agent and thus
can directly influence his reputation. Thus in theory two agents can push their mutual
coefficients in the agencies data base. For the calculation of changes of the agent-specific
central reputation value RYt+1 after an evaluation by X (r
X
t ) the following formula is used,
whereas γ represents the agent-specific equivalent to α in the first formula.
RYt+1 = RYt(1− β) + rXt β; with β = γRXt21 (24)
In summary, an agent in Avalanche, on the one hand, has the possibility to consult his
own experiences for the evaluation of potential trading partners, and, on the other, can
resort to the combined reputation values by the central rating agencies, which however
are not fraud resistant, as they do not consider the possibility of incorrect information
(level 1 in the modification phase). In addition, Avalanche does not have any direct social
component (for example comparable to a TrustNet).
Comparing Avalanche to the concepts of Marsh and Yu and Singh that proposed the
co-domain [−1, 1], it attracts attention that it used [0, 1] as Schillo does, instead and thus
emanates from the theory of probabilities. Several points speak in favour of the approach
- above all the relatively simple mathematical background. However, from the cognitive
point of view it remains questionable whether trustworthiness can be quantified so simple
(and possible linear), as between trust and distrust as well as between the different trust
levels huge differences exist [Luh89]. Furthermore Padovan et al. make no comments
about the case in which an agent has a reputation level below 0.5 and consequently defects
more often than cooperates. Under the assumption that the price is cleared with the risk
of loss, a defecting agent could participate in transactions a good many times (depending
on the choice of α, as well as on the factor whether only personal or agency information
is chosen). It only needs to offer a price that is low enough and as it has no intentions
21In case information about software agent Y are known in the agency, the mean value of all known
reputation values is used instead of RYr .
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of providing the good or service it does not have any costs. With regard to the rating
agencies another problem arises. Thus in the papers of Padovan et al. [Pad00, PSEP02]
it remains unclear how it should be implemented in the Avalanche structure. Should
there be an agency for every market or is a system-wide agency intended? Or might have
Padovan though of several competitive agencies and, if this is the case, how do the agents
choose the agency they rely on? In addition it remains unclear whether agents have to
pay for the information from the agency or whether they might get any money for the
evaluation they contribute. Hence, although the idea of a combination of own evaluations
and a rating agency seems relatively flexible and easy to realise, the weaknesses of the
concept have to be thought about and cognitive approaches such as gossip mechanisms
should be implemented to make the model more realistic.
3.9 Foner
Another reputation mechanisms is the one Leonard Newton Foner proposed in his PhD
thesis. Foner’s approach is a single context mechanism that shares similarities with PGP
and the “Web of Trust” [Fon99, p. 43], [Kuh99, p. 358 et seqq.]. Foner introduces the
matchmaking system Yenta and in this context discusses the question of trust with spe-
cial focus on TRUSTe22 with respect to privacy adherence. According to his papers,
it is Foner’s goal to develop an agent-based system which allows the pooling of users
with similar fields of interest without endangering privacy-relevant information unneces-
sarily. Therefore Foner describes a decentralized system architecture that allows for the
cooperation of several agents who are not necessarily familiar with one another, while
maintaining high security standards. Yenta is one sample application for this idea. It re-
lies on recommendations articulated by local interest-clusters (collaborative filtering). To
give any estimations about the trustworthiness of the users Yenta furthermore contains a
reputation mechanism, which despite the decentralised system architecture, is centralized
when it comes to the storage of the cooperative behaviour. This mechanism consists of
self-portrayals of users which are known to the local Yenta program, and whose trustwor-
thiness is guaranteed by third parties with encrypted digital signatures. In order to finally
find out the trustworthy agents, Yenta uses uses third party information in form of a kind
of web of trust in the recall stage. Hence, first of all, an agent which tries to estimate the
22TRUSTe was founded in 1997 by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Commerce.net to
foster online commerce by helping businesses and other online organizations to self-regulate privacy
concerns. Today it runs the world’s largest privacy seal program, with more than 2,000 Web sites
certified, including IBM, the Oracle Corporation or eBay.
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trustworthiness of an unknown agent checks whether it knows the trustworthiness of the
agent signing the self-portrait. If this is not the case, the search is expanded one step,
etc. Foner compares this to “small-town-gossip” [Fon99, p. 44] with the distinction that
in Yenta self-portraits are the main information source, whereas in the latter third party
information is more important. Thereby the final character of the network structure (only
some local reputation spots or a real network) is dependent on the social and political
decisions of the users, and is not bound to the system architecture [Fon99, p. 44]. In
contrast to most of the other mechanisms and proposals reviewed so far, when it comes
to the second stage of the 5-stage-process model, Foner does not see trustworthiness as
an expected value of the future behaviour or a measure between -1 and +1, but as an
explicit picture of social networks which have already influenced the Histos idea.
3.10 Sabater and Sierra (ReGreT)
Developed by Sabater and Sierra [Sab03, SS01, SS02], ReGreT is a reputation mechanism
which studies reputation in complex societies. It is an interesting model as it accounts for a
multi-faceted concept of reputation. In fact, it identifies three levels for which reputational
variables should be considered: individual, social and ontological system-related factors.
The individual one is considered the most reliable, as it stems from (reciprocal) evaluation
resulting from direct interaction with the target. [KKW07] When the agent does not have
enough direct information, it should use the social facet of reputation, which is made
up of three components: “witness reputation”; “neighbourhood reputation”; and “system
reputation”:
Witness information refers to evaluation coming from direct experience, and then referred
by a fellow agent. In order to choose whom to ask for information, the past’s partners’
evaluations about the target are considered using a heuristic that groups correlated evalu-
ations (coming from the same interactions) and filters them. Then one agent is chosen and
its evaluation of the target is picked up. This kind of information is not as trustworthy
as the direct information mentioned above. Every piece of witness information has some
uncertainty around itself. More detailed and extensive approaches, like the advancement
of ReGreT, called Repage [SPC06], have different modules to specify these two sources of
witness reputation. ReGreT does not differentiate between these two sources.
Neighbourhood reputation is the result of social contagion. In fact, the system adjusts the
previous reputational value to account for the reputation of the group that surrounds the
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Figure 5: The ReGreT Approach [Sab03, p. 42]
target, which is calculated from their relational behaviour.
Finally, system reputation is derived from the “institutional role” assigned to the target
by the system. If more than one role is assigned, only the prominent one is considered.
The roles may be those of seller, buyer, or the affiliation to one known company, of
which the subject has a reputation as it is, perhaps, affiliated to a concurrent company.
The ontological specification of reputation is used to distinguish different features of the
target’s possible behaviour such as delivery time, price surcharge, quality swindling, and
so on. Each of them is assigned a value that describes the target in detail. So, different
domains of reputation might thus be accounted for. The order of listing of the components
reflects their descending weight to the final value of the target’s reputation. This value
is a probabilistic one, describing the likelihood that the target will cooperate along the
logical dimensions of the contract specified by the ontology of it.
Following the three information sources, the ReGreT model employs three data bases, the
“outcomes data base” (ODB) for own experiences with other agents, the“information data
base” (IDB) for storage of witness information, and the “sociograms data base” (SDB) to
represent social structures (see figure 5).
Regret introduces an important distinction among different sources of social evaluation.
Its basic distinction between direct (personal) evaluation and the socially transmitted one
reflects the distinction between image and reputation; a fundamental one in the social
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cognitive view of the artefact. In addition it places agents in a social environment, which
is useful to account for social contagion as a necessary part of reputation. However,
the authors recognize that the sociological subdivision used in the model is probably
incomplete; it may in any event result in a suitable compromise between model complexity
and the mechanism’s requisites. Nevertheless it has to be stressed that social contagion is
just a part of the phenomenon that should not be overly-considered. Moreover, the model
seems to give way to communication between agents only as a result of asking, while in
real life it is as well the case that social information is received as a spontaneous offering,
a sort of “gift”. The important point not considered is the moment of spreading social
information, also called memetic act. Should it always be reciprocal evaluation? This
may have impact on the quality of information produced, as set of the evaluators overlaps
set the set of the target agents (i.e. the ones being evaluated); this may give way to
benevolence in information dissemination toward the target, resulting in the application
of a “rule of courtesy” and therefore the production of an over-inflated reputation (or
low provision of it). In this sense, the model is not realistic. The realism of modelling
is important to achieve the same benefits in place in the human artefact, which seems
to function rather well with regard to the task of assuring distributed social control and
norm enforcing.
3.11 Sabater et al. (RepAge)
RepAge [SPC06] is a decentralized single context computational reputation system, that
does not purely rely on mathematical ratings alone, but models the cognitive processing
of reputational information in the mind of an agent, using the cognitive theory of rep-
utation covered by [eRe06, CP02, MC00], as well as ideas from the Regret systems and
adds some new elements to this. Thereby Sabater et al. especially focus on the difference
between image and reputation, which in their view suggests “a way out from the para-
dox of sociality, i.e. the trade-off between agents’ autonomy and their need to adapt to
social environment” [SPC06, abstract]. This is explained by the authors by highlighting
the importance of two aspects with regard to the concept of reputation: on one hand,
agents are autonomous if they select partners based on their social evaluations (images),
and on the other hand, they need to update evaluations by taking into account others’.
Hence, Sabater et al. draw the conclusion that social evaluations must circulate and be
represented as “reported evaluations” or “meta-evaluations” (i.e. reputation), in order for
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agents to decide whether to accept them or not and whether to integrate this information
with their own image of the target. Consequently, RepAge considers possible defrauding
behavior of information sources in the recall phase.
RepAge itself is based on an algorithm which endows the agents with a heuristic used for
the processing and integration of the different components of reputation within a single
mind when evaluating and rating other, thus pursuing a cognitive approach in this respect.
It considers social evaluation as fuzzy values of 5 levels, and thereby tries to model actual
people’s informal evaluative statements by weighting the aggregation of this fuzzy values.
The aggregation itself is done with the help of a formula proposed by [Jag04] to which the
authors added the calculation of strength in order to get rid of the problem the formula
looses it sense in case the denominator turns 0 (what can happen easily):
wi =
∏
iw
j
i∑
i
∏
j w
j
i
23 (25)
Based upon these considerations, the authors present the an architecture for their repu-
tation mechanisms that can be seen in figure 6:
As it can be seen in the figure, RepAge very much focuses on the individual agents
and thus all information storage as well as all reasoning is done decentralised in the
individuals’ memories. The memory itself works in a bottom-up fashing, i.e. resulting
from the communicated images and meta-evaluations (reputation information) that are
attributed to the contractual context (bottom layer) decision are being made. Thereby it is
important to notice that at this point of time the predicates (i.e. information derived from
different sources) are not valued by RepAge at this stage. Based on the the information
transactions are being made and their outcome accounted for at the next layer. This is
not only done on a binary basis (i.e. the outcome is not just a tuple contract-fulfilment
with fulfilment taking the value 0 or 1) but an evaluation is done on how the contract was
fulfilled (i.e. the quality of service (QoS) is being accounted for).
Last but not least, in this conceptual layer, one final step needs to be taken in the RepAge
model: the evaluation on the information sources. This is done by comparing the output
of the transaction with the information given by the sources beforehand. Based on the
results of the evaluation, the model, in the next stage derives at five types of predicates:
23In the formula wji represents the weight of the fuzzy evaluations whereas the lower index i refers to
the different weights of the same fuzzy evaluations, and the higher one j is used to distinguish the
evaluations to aggregate.
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Figure 6: The RepAge Architecture [SPC06]
Candidate Image, Candidate Reputation, Image, Reputation and Confirmation. As the
prefix “candidate” already indicates, of the five the first two have no sufficient support to
become real image or reputation information yet. This might for example be the case if the
elements contributing are not of a sufficient number. The last predicate “confirmation”
comes from the former layer. It accounts for the quality of the information the agent
received by others. Thus it is a value of how accurate the information provided by the
informers was (based on the results of the transaction).
Finally, the last layer consists of two predicates: Cognitive dissonance and Certainty.
Whereas “certainty” refers to a state where the individual is certain about pieces of infor-
mation that are all in the same line of reasoning,“cognitive dissonance”refers to a situation
where the pieces of information all have sufficient support, however they contradict with
regard to a specific target. Depending on how strong and relevant this dissonance is, the
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model accounts for actions to be taken to solve the dissonance.
Once all information from one transaction have passed through all the stages and layers
of the agents memory, the process of starts over and over again for each new piece of
information. Thus, the memory (including the top layer) are constantly updated giving
the agent the ability to learn and reason about its behaviour as well as its own strategy.
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4 Summary
In this paper, we have proposed a classification scheme for analysing reputation mecha-
nisms and comparing them. This scheme consists of five stages that form a process and
link two transactions. In order to show how different models are to be seen in the context
of our 5-Stage-process model and which design choices could be made within the five
stages, in the further course of this paper we then have analysed a set of well known rep-
utation mechanisms. Thereby it has to be noted that the choice of mechanisms was made
to show the differences in design, and consequently the list of reputation mechanisms we
examined does not lodge the claim of completeness.
To sum up, as a last step, the results of the analysis shall now be presented in a condensed
form using a summary table (see table 4). Of course, the heterogeneity as well as com-
plexity of the models presented makes the condensed comparison very difficult, especially
as only a small number of criteria can be accounted for. Consequently a slight subjective
input that all kinds of categorizations like this one have, remains. Furthermore, it must
be said, that if not stated differently, we only concentrated on the initial models, of which
many however have been developed further by the authors themselves or by others.
Nevertheless now we will try to condense and compare the mechanisms discussed. The
criteria for the comparison are all based on the four primary stages of the process-model
and should therefore need no further explanation. The can be seen in the following table:
Recording of cooperation behaviour
single-context model (SC)
multi-context model (MC)
Rating of cooperation behaviour
cognitive (C)
mathematical (MA)
Storage of cooperation behaviour
centralized storage (CS)
decentralized storage (DS)
Recall of cooperation behaviour
trust model (T)
reputation model (RE)
Degree of cheating accounted for in the
recall phase
Level 0 (L0)
Level 1 (L1)
Level 2 (L2)
Table 3: Summary of the 5-Stage-Process-Model Criteria
Using these criteria, for the mechanisms discussed in this paper, the following final picture
can be drawn:
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As expected and described before, most of the models are single-context models that use
several sources of information, with the most important one being witness information.
Thereby the focal point in the information processing are mathematical paradigm, with
only one mechanisms focusing on cognitive information. This is especially interesting as an
correlation between the rating and the strategy adaption seems to exist. Thus, although
most mathematical models account for the evolution of the starting trust and/or reputa-
tion parameters, a adaption of the actual strategy changing the formulas used, cannot be
found in any of the mathematical models. Concerning the data storage, most mechanisms
focus on centralized solution, however first attempt for decentralized approaches can be
found. Last but not least, due to the focus of this paper, all except one mechanism are rep-
utation mechanisms, accounting for the importance of third party information. However,
about only half of the reputation mechanisms account for the problem that information
sources may deliver wrong information on purpose making, which however makes these
models far more complex.
Summing up, reputation and trust mechanisms with manifold facets of implementation can
be found when reading current literature on securing artificial societies. These range from
simple trust model to very complex cognitive approaches that take into account cheating
and much more. All of the models have their particular advantages and disadvantages
allowing the designers of artificial societies to choose a mechanisms based on their needs
(e.g. in terms of complexity). Nevertheless, when choosing one needs to keep in mind
that although being presented with the help of different stages in this paper, these stages
are interlinked. Thus, design choices in one stage might influence another stage, so that
reputation as process should always be reasoned about.
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ISSN
The Internet has caused a revolution in trading. 
Especially cheap items are now easy to buy and 
sell on the Internet. As a consequence, sellers 
nowadays offer a wide range of products on the 
web, creating an abundance of choice for 
consumers. Consumers have the opportunity to 
browse on different auction sites for the item 
they really want. Along with this success story, 
however, came the stories of people being 
cheated by fraudulent online sellers. These frauds 
cover a range from not delivering what has been 
promised, the overrating of a product's condition, 
to deliberate acts of theft. They are a result of 
so-called asymmetric information. Trust and 
reputation mechanisms are intended to address 
this asymmetric information distribution. This 
article surveys the most common trust and 
reputation systems.
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